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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ARTICLE

DOES ISRAEL HAVE A CONSTITUTION?*

THE HONORABLE DALIA DORNER**
1. As with every country, Israel has a material constitution, meaning
governing arrangements that are anchored in legal norms that establish the
branches of government - the legislative branch, the executive branch and the
judiciary - and the relationships among them. The question is whether Israel
also has a formal constitution: a norm that is superior to regular legislation so
that if the laws and the constitution conflict, the provisions of the constitution
will be preferred. A second question that arises asks which branch is
authorized to determine the constitutionality of ordinary legislation.
2. From the outset of the establishment of the State, a formal constitution
was anticipated. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel
(hereafter the Declaration of Independence) promises that a formal
Constitution would be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly no later
than October 1, 1948. A formal Constitution was among the criteria discussed
by the United Nations and favored in a United Nations decision of November
29, 1947. However, the plan of drafting a comprehensive written constitution
for the State of Israel was never realized.
The Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel provides guiding
principles for the State of Israel. It articulates the basis for a human rights
charter that serves as a backdrop for the Basic Laws and all ordinary
legislation. According to the Declaration of Independence, the State of Israel
“will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of

* Justice Dalia Dorner presented this lecture at Saint Louis University School of Law on April 12,
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** Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Israel.
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Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its
inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of
religion, conscience, language, education and culture.”
Because of constant threats to Israel’s security, Israel adopted Emergency
Regulations and considered itself in a state of emergency, conditions that
complicated the drafting and adoption of a formal Constitution. In addition,
the religious community viewed the Torah, or Jewish law, as paramount and
thus the notion of a supreme law embodied by the Constitution threatened to
offend this segment of the population. Prime Minister David Ben Gurion was
among the most famous opponents to the adoption of a constitution. He did
not dispute the power of the Knesset to adopt a constitution, but argued that the
Knesset was not required to do so immediately and that it had the power to
postpone the adoption of a constitution until a later date.
In 1950, a compromise was reached that managed to preserve a number of
options. This compromise, the Harari Resolution, established that Israel’s
formal constitution would be drafted in a piecemeal fashion through the
adoption of a series of Basic Laws. According to the Harari Resolution, these
Basic Laws would ultimately be unified as the Constitution of the State of
Israel. Thus the principle of a formal Constitution was preserved, while it was
accepted that it would not have to be drafted as a single unified document from
the beginning. Instead, articles of the Constitution could be adopted in the
form of Basic Laws.
In reality, the principles of the bill of rights contained in the Declaration of
Independence were not granted constitutional status, and the recognition of
human rights – those of liberty, equality, freedom of expression and
occupation, freedom of conscience and religion - as fundamental norms of
Israeli law was a creation of the Supreme Court. The Court held that although
legislation cannot be invalidated on the basis of the Declaration of
Independence, all laws of Israel, including those enacted during the British
Mandate before the establishment of the State, must be interpreted in light of
the principles expressed by the Declaration.
The basic principle concerning freedom of expression in Israel was first
established in the famous Kol Ha’am case. The rule provides that the right to
free expression cannot be restricted unless the following concurrent conditions
are met: (i) the explicit authorization of primary legislation; (ii) near certainty,
or at least a reasonable likelihood, that the realization of the freedom of
expression will harm an important interest; and (iii) that the harm to the
interest will be actual and severe. On the basis of this rule, the Court ordered
the police to allow demonstrations in situations in which a fear existed but did
not reach the level of proximate danger to the public peace. In addition, the
Court intervened against government decisions to restrict freedom of
expression even when the expression was hurtful, offensive, or disgusting.
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In the area of equality, judicial decisions established the principle that, in
the absence of a legislative directive to the contrary, the government
authorities must conduct themselves in an egalitarian or non-discriminatory
manner. Discrimination is cause for the invalidation of an administrative
decision, and the law will be interpreted, to the extent possible, in accordance
with the principle of equality. On the basis of these rules, discriminatory
decisions were invalidated, including those based on group membership (such
as sex, race, religion, etc.) and those based on administrative or political
rationales.1
3. The legal principles that anchored these human rights can also be
considered part of Israel’s constitution. Yet, these norms applied only to the
administrative bodies. The power of the Knesset to legislate remained
completely unrestricted. Indeed, over the years, eleven Basic Laws were
enacted: Basic Law: the Knesset, Basic Law: Lands of Israel, Basic Law: The
President, Basic Law: National Economy, Basic Law: The Army, Basic Law:
Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, Basic Law: State Comptroller, Basic Law: The
Government, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty. Only the last two Basic Laws, enacted in 1992, deal with human
rights. The primary legislation of the two is Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty.
The rights were defined in the two Basic Laws in absolute terms:
The life, body or dignity of any person shall not be violated.2
A person’s property shall not be infringed.3
Every person is entitled to protection of his life, body and dignity.4
The liberty of a person shall not be deprived or restricted through
imprisonment, detention, extradition or in any other manner.5
Every Israeli citizen is entitled to enter Israel.6
Every person is entitled to privacy and to the confidentiality of his life.7
Every Israel national or resident has the right to engage in any occupation,
profession or trade.8

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

H.C. 25/53, Koh Ha’am Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior, 7(1) P.D. 165.
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 2, 1992, S.H. 1391.
Id. at § 3.
Id. at § 4.
Id. at § 5.
Id. at § 6.
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 7, 1992, S.H. 1391.
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, § 3, 1992, S.H. 1391.
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Alongside these rights that are defined in absolute terms, the authority to
limit them is defined in the Basic Laws. Human rights are not absolute but
relative, and their parameters are derived from the balance between them and
other principles that society has an interest to protect. In the United States, the
Constitution is silent as to the manner of balancing human rights, and thus the
determination is left to the Supreme Court. In Israel, the Basic Laws, like
many other constitutions, contain a Limitation Clause. The following language
of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty explains the limitation:
There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a Law
befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to
an extent no greater than required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of
express authorization in such Law.9

This provision must be read in conjunction with the Declaration of Purpose
in Section 1 of the Basic Law, which defines the values of the State as those of
a Jewish and democratic state.
4. Because of difficulties in reaching a national consensus and fears of the
religious parties concerning a change in the status quo according to which
there is no separation between religion and State, and because the authority to
determine issues concerning marriage and divorce is in the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Courts, the Basic Laws included provisions that
grant force to legislation enacted prior to these Basic Laws. In addition, the
two most recent Basic Laws, according to the stated intent of the Knesset,
reflect a political compromise and national consensus concerning specific
rights. Thus the Basic Laws do not include central rights such as the principle
of equality, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, conscience and
information. To this day, the Knesset has not enacted a Basic Law: Legislation
that establishes the superiority of the Basic Laws over ordinary legislation and
the authority of the courts to review the constitutionality of legislation. The
Basic Laws are not sufficiently entrenched, and most of the Basic Laws,
including the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which is the central law
concerning the protection of human rights, can be changed by an ordinary
majority of votes in the Knesset.
5. The argument has been made that the Basic Laws can be defined as lex
imperfecto and that they determine principles that cannot be implemented in
practice. There are those who believe that Basic Laws that were enacted by an
ordinary majority of Knesset cannot be considered a constitution.10
6. This position was rejected by the Supreme Court of Israel.

9. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 8, 1992, S.H. 1391.
10. Ruth Gavison, The Constitutional Revolution – A Description of Reality or SelfFulfilling Prophecy, 38 MISHPATIM 21 (1997).
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Already in 1969, in the Bergman case,11 the Supreme Court held that the
Knesset has the ability to limit itself through an entrenched clause in a Basic
Law, and that the Court is authorized to invalidate an ordinary statute that
contradicts such a provision. Indeed, in the same decision, the Court
intentionally avoided ruling on “weighty preliminary questions of a
constitutional nature, relating to the status of the Basic Laws, and to the
justiciability before this court of the issue of the Knesset’s actual compliance
with a self-imposed limitation .”12 These questions were decided by a panel of
nine judges in the case of Bank Mizrachi following the enactment of the Basic
Laws.13
In the Bank Mizrachi decision, in establishing unanimously that the Court
has the authority to review the constitutionality of legislation, the Supreme
Court of Israel followed the law of the United States. In the United States, as
in Israel and in contrast to other countries such as Canada, the Constitution has
no explicit provision authorizing courts to determine the constitutionality of
ordinary legislation.14
In the United States, the power of the Supreme Court to determine the
constitutionality of acts of other branches of government is a basic element of
the system of government. However, this has not always been the case. An
examination of the history of the United States Supreme Court reveals the
Court’s continuing effort to establish and maintain the power of the judiciary.
In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall established the principle that
the Constitution is a superior form of law and that the Court is the body to
determine whether a statute is inconsistent with this law. Chief Justice
Marshall established that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”15
7. According to the Israeli constitutional structure, questions of
constitutionality are decided by the judiciary. Therefore, in the absence of
another arrangement in the law, the authority to review the validity of a statute
is granted to all courts or tribunals. The decision of a judicial body other than
the Supreme Court will, by the nature of things, be limited to the specific case
before it. However, a decision of the Supreme Court, the court of highest
instance whose decisions are binding precedents, can in fact invalidate a law
that is unconstitutional.
In my opinion, criticism of the Court as having seized authority for itself is
unfounded. The assertion that the Limitation Clause is of declarative force

11. H.C. 98/69, Bergman v. Minister of Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693.
12. Id. at 696.
13. C.A. 6821/93, Unified Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Collective Village, 49(4) P.D. 221.
14. See, e.g., CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt.I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 24(1).
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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only is negated by the explicit provision preserving the force of all statutes
enacted prior to the Basic Law. Such a provision would have been completely
superfluous had it been impossible to invalidate legislation that failed to pass
the tests of the Limitations Clause.
8. In Bank Mizrachi, a majority of the Court held that the Basic Laws are
enacted by the Knesset as the Constitutional Authority of Israel, and that the
Basic Laws enjoy a superior normative status as compared with ordinary
legislation, which is enacted by the Knesset in its role as the Legislative Body
of Israel. The Knesset is not authorized to enact statutes other than those that
befit the provisions of the Basic Laws. Therefore, when a conflict arises
between a provision of a Basic Law and a provision of a statute that precludes
the fulfillment of both simultaneously, the provision of the Basic Law will be
favored as it enjoys a higher normative status than legislative provisions.
It becomes clear that the Basic Laws of Israel that are our formal
constitution are also rigid or entrenched in the sense that an ordinary statute
passed by the Knesset cannot infringe upon them unless the Basic law itself
contains an express provision to that effect.
9. As discussed earlier, the Basic Laws fail to acknowledge central human
rights, and there are those who believe that all the rights not explicitly
mentioned - the principle of equality, freedom of expression, freedom of
religion and conscience - can be included in the right to dignity. In this way, it
is argued, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty can be transformed into
a complete Bill of Rights.
I doubt whether it is possible, and in any case appropriate, to interpret the
Basic Law as protecting rights that are not mentioned in the Law, when the
clear intent of the legislator was to refrain from anchoring such rights in the
Basic Law in the absence of a national consensus. At the same time, even if
rights are not added through interpretation of the Law, there is no reasonable
way to interpret the right to dignity such that degradation of an individual
would not be considered an infringement of the right protected by the Basic
Law. The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty protects against a harm that
leads to degradation, that is a harm to a human being that goes to the essence
of his or her personhood. In this way, the Basic Law protects the principle of
equality, when an individual is discriminated against on the basis of gender,
race or religion16 and the freedom of expression, religion and conscience, and
scientific creation from statutes that limit the personal fulfillment of a human
being.17
10. As I explained earlier, human rights anchored in the Basic Laws can be
limited according to the measuring principles established by the Limitation

16. H.C. 4541/94, Miller v. Minister of Defense P.D. 59(4) 94, 131-32.
17. Cr. A. 4409/94 Golan v. Prison Services 40(4) P.D. 136, 190.
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Clause which include four elements: authorization by Law, a proper purpose,
proportionality, and befitting the values of the State of Israel.
The first element reflects the Constitutional Principle that requires an
infringement of a right to be authorized explicitly by Law or through explicit
consent.
11. The element concerning a proper purpose requires that the
infringement of a right be for a purpose that serves a public goal that could
justify an infringement of a fundamental right in a democratic system.
12. The most important element is that the degree of harm to the right be
no greater than required to attain the goal. This is the Proportionality
Requirement, conformity with which is expressed through three balancing
tests: the suitability of the means to the goal; the adoption of a means that
infringes upon a fundamental right only as a last resort and for lack of any
other reasonable means; and the adoption of a means that harms a right only in
a case in which the objective is sufficiently important and the harm that would
result from not pursuing such an objective justifies the harm to the
fundamental right.
As for these balancing tests, it must be emphasized that no one of these
tests is absolute. First, ordinarily, the legislative branch has discretion in
applying the balancing tests. That is, it is enough that the legislator have a
feasible view that the means chosen suit the purpose, or that the right is
infringed to the smallest extent possible in achieving the purpose, or that the
harm to the right necessary to achieve the goal is reasonable. According to the
accepted terminology of administrative law, the legislator’s view must be
within the “margin of reasonableness” in order for the law to meet the
proportionality requirement. Second, as part of the first balancing test, the
suitability of the means to the goal, an absolute certainty that the means will
achieve their purpose is not required. It is enough that there is a high
probability that the goal will be achieved through the use of the chosen means.
The degree of probability required will depend on the relative importance of
the right being harmed and the purpose of the infringement. Third, the second
balancing test, which requires that rights be infringed upon only as a last resort,
does not obligate the Knesset to chose means that do not infringe upon a right
or which curb the infringement at any cost. The public resources are by the
nature of things limited. Despite the unquestionable importance of individual
rights, it is not possible, nor appropriate to prefer their fulfillment absolutely
over all other public interests. Thus, for example, it is possible to prevent
suspects in all cases from endangering the public through “house arrest” under
the auspices of the police. However, it is, at times, impossible to disregard the
possibility of achieving the same goal by the less expensive means of detention
in prison, even though such a measure infringes upon the rights of the suspect
far more than house arrest would. Further, there are various levels at which a
goal can be attained. Sometimes, a lesser harm of a right can enable a greater
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realization of the goal. Therefore, it is sufficient that the Knesset reasonably
consider, in light of the circumstances, the minimization of the harm to a right.
In my opinion, it is appropriate that in applying all three of these balancing
tests, the substance of the right potentially harmed will be taken into account.
13. This concept is recognized in other countries and by the administrative
Law in Israel.
In the United States, different levels of scrutiny were developed to test the
constitutionality of statutes that infringe upon civil rights. These levels of
scrutiny depend on the degree of importance of the values and interests
underlying each right. At the bottom of the hierarchy of rights are economic
rights. An infringement of such a right will be justified if it is reasonably
related to a legitimate public interest.18 At the top of the ladder are overriding
rights with special status, such as the right to participate in elections, freedom
of expression and freedom of movement. An infringement of such rights is
allowed only to serve a compelling state interest that cannot be realized by less
intrusive means.19
In Israel, when we are confronted by a harm to a right executed by an
administrative body, we balance the substance of the right, the specific weight
and the rationale at the root of the right on one side against the importance of
the interest conflicting with the right, on the other.20
The degree of importance attributed to a right in the balancing framework
in which the constitutionality of the infringement will be examined is likely to
change from case to case pursuant to the values and interests harmed in the
specific circumstances. Thus, for example, harm to an individual is not the
equivalent of a harm to many people or to the public in general.
This approach applies to all three of the balancing tests.
Concerning the test of whether the means chosen suit the objective, the
degree of certainty required in matching the means to the goal and concerning
its effectiveness is influenced by the importance of the right and its underlying
reasons. When dealing with rights of great importance, the standard will be
one of “near certainty,” and possibly nearly absolute certainty, that the means
by which a right is infringed upon will enable the efficient and complete
realization of the goal. In contrast, when a less weighty right is considered, it
is possible that a “reasonable possibility” of realizing the goal will suffice.
As for the requirement that the means chosen be the least harmful to the
right in question, which is clearly not an absolute test, the choice of means will
be affected by the nature of the right being infringed. When considering the
infringement of an especially important fundamental right, we must be stricter

18. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 366 U.S. 106 (1949).
19. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
20. See, e.g., H.C. 399/85, Kahane v. Executive Board of the Broadcasting Authority, 41(3)
P.D. 255, 284.
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in our choice of the least restrictive means, even if such a means is expensive.
The law will differ in cases in which the right in question is of lesser weight.
Protection of such a right will not require the State to adopt especially
burdensome means.
As concerns the test of balancing between the benefit resulting from
attainment of the goal and the harm of the means by which it is attained, such a
test will take into account, as is the case with administrative bodies, the nature
of the right in question, the underlying rationales and the values and interests
harmed in the specific case.
14. The element concerning the values of the State of Israel requires that
the infringement of a right befit the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and
democratic state. Interpretation of this provision is by no means simple. Even
though the meaning of democratic principles may be clear to all, the question
remains as to how to interpret the principles of a Jewish state and how to
resolve a possible conflict between the two sets of values. The Supreme Court
has not yet been confronted directly with this question. A number of opinions
have been expressed concerning this issue.
It is clear that the segment of Israeli society that supports a Halachic State,
or a state run on the basis of Jewish religious law, believe that the principles of
the Jewish state are those of adherence to Jewish religious law, which should
prevail when in conflict with democratic principles. One Israeli Supreme
Court Justice expressed the opinion that when confronted with a number of
approaches compatible with a democratic value, we must prefer the approach
most in agreement with principles expressed in the Jewish religious law. In
this way, it is argued, we should synthesize democratic and Jewish principles.21
Another Supreme Court Justice expressed the belief that the Jewish values
of the State of Israel are the values shared by Judaism and democracy: respect
for your fellow being, the sanctity of life, social justice, preservation of human
dignity and such values that Judaism has always imparted.22
Another argument asserted in academia is that the bi-principled mandate of
a Jewish and democratic state broadens the protection of human rights. The
Limitation Clause of the Basic Law does not specify when rights can be
conferred and Jewish law does not recognize all human rights. As such, it is
enough that legislation infringes on either democratic or Jewish principles so
as to make it an invalid infringement on human rights. According to this view,
a Law which violates rights under the Basic Law, that befits the principles of
the State as a democracy, but does not befit the principles of a Jewish state
cannot be enacted by the Knesset. And vice versa. Such a Law cannot be
enacted if it befits the values of a Jewish state but does not befit the principles
21. C.A. 294/93, Burial Society of Jerusalem v. Kestenbaum, 46(2) P.D. 464, 511.
22. Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1 MISHPAT
UMIMSHAL 9, 30-31 (1992-1993).
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of the state as a democracy. This approach requires that the principles of a
Jewish state that protect human rights should be interpreted broadly so as to
widen the protection of human rights by the Basic Laws.23
15. In my opinion, a suitable interpretation must create a harmony between
democratic and Jewish values. The State of Israel is a state governed by law
and not on the basis of Jewish religious precepts. Therefore the principles of a
Jewish state are not identical to the principles of Jewish religious law. Instead,
these Jewish values are those that were at the basis of the establishment of the
State of Israel - the Zionism that led to the establishment of the State, the
Hebrew language, the observance of holidays and days of rest according to the
Jewish calendar, and most importantly the “principles of liberty, justice, equity
and peace of the heritage of Israel” according to which the courts must also
decide legal questions for which there are no answers in the legislation, case
law, or by analogy.24 These principles also befit the democratic character of
the State. Thus there is nothing about the bi-principled mandate of the Basic
Law that limits rights more than is necessary in a democratic system.
The United States Declaration of Independence reads:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

However, over the course of many years, the Supreme Court of the United
States ignored the discrimination against Afro-American individuals, and even
granted legitimacy to slavery in the Dredd Scott case. Without the
internalization of values by society, a constitution is not enough. Still, the
declaration that “all men are created equal” continued to plague the American
conscience and in the end, led to changes in the law and society. The poet
Robert Frost expressed it well:25
That’s a hard mystery of Jefferson’s.
What did he mean? Of course the easy way
Is to decide it simply isn’t true.
It may not be. I heard a fellow say so.
But never mind, the Welshman got it planted
Where it will trouble us a thousand years.
Each age will have to reconsider it.

History proves, therefore, that the realization of a true democracy, as
opposed to a formal democracy, requires the support and completion of the
constitution by additional values, among them the obligation to treat all

23. Ariel Bendor, Defects in the Enactment of Basic Laws, 2 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 443, 44352 (1994).
24. Foundations of Law Statute, 1980, S.H. 978.
25. See Simon Greenberg, Judaism and the Democratic Ideal, DEMOCRATIC CULTURE,
(Avi Sagi & Yedida Stern, eds. 1999) at 189.
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individuals equally, and to take responsibility for the fate of another. These
values can be found in the heritage of Israel. The Talmud states:
For this reason, Adam was created an individual, to teach you that one who
causes the loss of one life is considered to have caused the loss of an entire
world; and one who saves a life is considered to have saved an entire world.

The synthesis between Jewish values, as I understand them, and
democratic principles eases the internalization of democratic principles on the
part of Israeli society and strengthens them.
16. On the basis of these principles, the Supreme Court of Israel
invalidates provisions of a law that infringe upon the freedom of occupation.26
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a law that infringed
upon the right to property as it determined that the infringement withstood the
tests of the Limitation Clause.
17. Indeed, Israel’s formal constitution is unfinished. It still needs to be
completed through the enactment of additional Basic Laws and further
entrenchment. I hope that the Knesset, as the legislative branch, will complete
its endeavor. Yet, even in its unfinished state, the Constitution expressed by
the Basic Laws enjoys full normative force and superiority over ordinary
legislation. And even in the existing constitutional framework, the Basic Laws
can be enforced through judicial review.

26. H.C. 1715/97, The Bureau of Investment Advisors in Israel v. The Minister of Finance,
51(4) P.D. 367.
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